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Agreeing to agree
Ehud Lehrer
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Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have com-
mon knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide.
But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such
that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide? We show that
a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty ﬁnite
event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at F that
the agents cannot tell whether E occurred. Second, this still holds true at F, when
F itself becomes common knowledge.
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theorem.
JEL classification. C70, D82.
1. Introduction
1.1 Agreeing to disagree and agreeing to agree
Canagentshavecommonknowledgeoftheirbeliefs? InaseminalpaperAumann (1976)
demonstrates the impossibility of agreeing to disagree:F o rany posteriors with a com-
mon prior, if the agents’ posteriors for an event E are different (= they disagree), then
the agents cannot have common knowledge (= agreeing) of these posteriors. Thus, the
short answer to our opening question is that agents cannot have common knowledge of
their beliefs when they are different.
But can there be other reasons why agents may fail to have common knowledge of
theirbeliefs, even whenthesebeliefsarethesame? Obviously, agents mayfailincidently
to know each others posteriors, and thus, a fortiori they cannot have common knowl-
edge of them, even if they coincide. Our question here is not concerned with such an in-
cidental lack of common knowledge of the posteriors, but rather with the impossibility
of having such common knowledge in principle. That is, we examine the impossibility
of having such common knowledge regardless of the beliefs held by the agents.
We investigate the conditions under which there exist posteriors with a common
prior, such that it is common knowledge that the agents’ posteriors for an event E
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coincide. Using the terminology of Aumann’s theorem, we ask, “When is agreeing to
agree about the posteriors of E possible?” We clarify this question by examining several
examples.
Example 1. Each of two ﬁrms can be either proﬁtable or losing. Thus, there are four
possible states of the world (proﬁtable proﬁtable), (proﬁtable losing), (losing proﬁta-
ble),a n d(losing losing). Each ﬁrm knows only how well it does.
Consider ﬁrst the event E that both ﬁrms have the same ﬁnancial situation. That
is, E ={ (proﬁtable proﬁtable) (losing losing)}. There are many posteriors that have a
common prior such that the ﬁrms have common knowledge that the posterior proba-
bilities of E coincide. For instance, consider a common prior, μ,w i t h
μ(proﬁtable proﬁtable) = μ(losing losing) = p
and
μ(proﬁtable losing) = μ(losing proﬁtable) = q 
where 2p + 2q = 1.T h e n ,in each of the four states, both ﬁrms have the same posterior
for E: p/(p + q). Thus, it is common knowledge in every state that the posteriors for E
are the same. ♦
Example 2. In the state space of the previous example, consider the event E ={ (los-
ing proﬁtable)}. Note that the only event about which there is common knowledge is
the whole state space. Therefore, if for some posteriors it is common knowledge that
both posteriors for E are p, then the posteriors for E must be p in all four states. How-
ever, for any posterior on this space, when ﬁrm 1 is proﬁtable, its posterior for E is 0.
Thus, the only value p can have is 0.
Consider the complement of E, denoted ¬E. When ﬁrm 2 is losing, its posterior
for ¬E is 1. Thus, by the same argument as above, the only p for which there can be
common knowledge that both posteriors for ¬E are p,i s1 .
As opposed to the event E in Example 1, in this example the possibility of agreeing
to agree about the posteriors of E,o r¬E, is limited to trivial ones, i.e., 0 or 1. ♦
1.2 A necessary condition for the possibility of agreeing to agree
ThedifferencebetweentheeventsinExamples1and2suggestsasimplenecessarycon-
dition for agreeing to agree. In any state at which the ﬁrm’s posterior for E is nontrivial,
the ﬁrm cannot tell whether E i st h ec a s eo rn o tE is the case. We say in this case that
the ﬁrm is ignorant of E. Therefore, we can state the following condition.
If there exist posteriors with a common prior for which it is common knowledge that both
posteriors for E are p for some 0 <p<1, then it is necessarily common knowledge that
both ﬁrms are ignorant of E.
Now, in the ﬁrst example, the ﬁrms are ignorant of E in each state. Thus, it is com-
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agree is satisﬁed. In the second example, in contrast, in all states there is no common
knowledge that the ﬁrms are ignorant of E. Therefore, no matter what nontrivial pos-
teriors for E the agents may have, the event where their posteriors coincide cannot be
common knowledge.
Surprisingly, this necessary condition is not sufﬁcient, as demonstrated by the next
example.
Example3. Theproﬁtofeachoftwoﬁrmscanbeanyinteger,positiveornegative. Each
ﬁrm is informed only of its proﬁt. Let E be the event that ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is higher. That is,
E istheevent(i<j). Ineachstate,noﬁrmcantellwhether2’sproﬁtishigher. Therefore,
it is common knowledge in each state that both ﬁrms are ignorant of E. Nevertheless,
no matter what posteriors with a common prior the ﬁrms may have, there can be no
common knowledge that both posteriors for E are p for some 0 <p<1.
Toseethis,assumetothecontrarythatμisacommonprioranditiscommonknowl-
edge that both posteriors of E are p with 0 <p<1. As the only event that is common
knowledge is the whole space, it follows that the posteriors of E are p at each state of
the world. Fix k and consider the right half-space Rk = (i ≥ k), the upper half-space
Uk = (j > k),thequadrantsQ1
k = Q1 = Uk∩¬Rk andQ2
k = Q2 = Rk∩¬Uk,andthecones
C1
k = C1 = E ∩ Rk and C2
k = C2 =¬ E ∩ Uk.I ti se a s yt os e et h a tE ∩ Uk = C1 ∪ Q1 and
¬E∩Rk = C2∪Q2, and the unions are disjoint. By our assumption, μ(C1∪Q1)/μ(C2) =
μ(E ∩ Uk)/μ(¬E ∩ Uk) = p/(1 − p) and μ(C2 ∪ Q2)/μ(C1) = μ(¬E ∩ Rk)/μ(E ∩ Rk) =
(1 − p)/p. It follows from these equations that μ(Q1) =[ p/(1 − p)]μ(C2) − μ(C1) and
μ(Q2) =[ (1 − p)/p]μ(C1) − μ(C2).T h u s , μ(Q1) =− [ p/(1 − p)]μ(Q2). This implies
that μ(Q1) = 0. As this holds for each k and E =

kQ1
k, it follows that μ(E) = 0,w h i c h
contradicts our assumption. ♦
1.3 Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
Our ﬁrst result provides a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the possibility of agree-
ing to agree in terms of the information structure only. Although the notion of agreeing
to agree involves posteriors and common priors, our characterization does not employ
any probabilistic notions.
AgreeingtoagreeonnontrivialposteriorsforE ispossibleifandonlyifthereisanonempty
ﬁnite event F at which it is common knowledge that the agents are ignorant of E, and this
holds true at F also after F becomes common knowledge.
Since agreeing to agree is impossible in Example 3, such a nonempty ﬁnite event F
cannot exist in this example. Indeed, suppose that there exists such an event F.L e tim
be the maximal proﬁt of 1 in all the states of F. By the property of F, 1 is still ignorant of
E after being informed of F. In particular, 1 cannot tell that ¬E is the case. Therefore,
t h e r em u s te x i s tap o i n t(im j0) in F that is also in E. By the deﬁnition of E, im <j 0.B y
the deﬁnition of im, for each point (i j0) ∈ F, i ≤ im and hence i<j 0.T h u s ,(i j0) ∈ E.
But this means that when ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is j0 and it is informed of F, it knows E.T h i s
contradicts the assumption that it is ignorant of E.
Anothercharacterizationofthepossibilityofagreeingtoagreeisgiveninprobabilis-
tic terms.272 Lehrer and Samet Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Agreeing to agree about nontrivial posteriors for E is possible if and only if it is possible
with a common prior that has a ﬁnite support.
While ﬁrms cannot agree on the probability that one is more proﬁtable than the
other, as shown in the previous example, ﬁrms can still agree on the probability that
they are equally proﬁtable. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 4. In the same state space as in Example 3,d e ﬁ n eE to be the event where
both ﬁrms are equally proﬁtable, that is, E = (i = j). The conditions for the pos-
sibility of agreeing to agree hold in this case. Indeed, consider the ﬁnite set F =
{(1 1) (1 0) (0 1) (0 0)}. It is common knowledge at every state, and in particular at
every state of F, that the agents are ignorant of E. Second, when this ﬁnite set becomes
common knowledge, the ﬁrms are still ignorant of E; moreover, their ignorance is also
common knowledge.
Using the set F, it is easy to construct posteriors with a common prior for which
agreeing to agree holds for E. Consider the common prior μ,w h e r eμ(1 1) = μ(1 0) =
μ(0 1) = μ(0 0) = 1
4. When a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is either 0 or 1, the posterior for E is 1
2. Since
any information set of a ﬁrm whose proﬁt is neither 0 nor 1 has probability zero accord-
ing to μ, one may deﬁne the posteriors in these elements in an arbitrary fashion. In
particular, one may deﬁne these posteriors for E to be 1
2. Deﬁning the posteriors in this
way makes the fact that the posteriors for E are 1
2 common knowledge at each state. ♦
1.4 Positive common priors
In the previous example, agreeing to agree is made possible by a degenerate common
prior. It vanishes on all but two elements in each partition. Our next result gives a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the possibility of agreeing to agree with a posi-
tive common prior. That is, a common prior that assigns a positive probability to every
information set.
For any given event E, we deﬁne simple-structured, nonempty, and ﬁnite events
calledloopsonE (seeDeﬁnition4andFigure1). Oneoftheconditionsthatdeﬁnealoop
implies that when a loop on E becomes common knowledge, it is common knowledge
at the loop that the agents are ignorant of E. This property links the notion of loops to
the condition in our main result.
When the information set of an agent intersects a loop, we say that this agent does
not exclude loops. Our third result is the following statement.
Agreeing to agree is possible with a common prior that is positive on all information sets if
and only if it is common knowledge at some state that the agents do not exclude loops.
1.5 T h er o l eo fﬁ n i t e n e s s
The less obvious part of our characterizations is the ﬁniteness. It has to do with the way
E and ¬E are entangled in the information structure. When there is no ﬁnite F with
the required property, it is possible to separate E and ¬E by arranging the partitions in
a way that resembles the structure of the events in Example 3. When there is such F,Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Agreeing to agree 273
the sets E and ¬E are “mixed” together like those in Examples 1 and 4. The separation
is described in Proposition 3.I nProposition 4 it is shown why this separation implies
the nonexistence of posteriors that makes agreeing to agree possible. This proposition
generalizes an argument made in S a m e te ta l .(2004) for the special case of Example 3,
which is also related to an intriguing puzzle due to Cover (1987).
1.6 No trade
Suppose the posterior probabilities of E at some state for player 1 and 2 are p and q,
respectively, with p>q . Consider a bet on event E in which if E obtains, player 1 pays
x>0 toplayer2, andif ¬E obtains, player2pays y>0 toplayer1. If x/y isintheinterval
((1−q)/q (1−p)/p), thentheexpectedpayoffofthebetatthisstateispositive forboth
players and both are willing to bet.
However, by expressing their will to accept the bet, the players convey information
to each other, which results in a reﬁnement of their partitions. Given this new informa-
tion, the two players reassess the probability of E and their willingness to bet. When
the process is repeated, it converges to limit partitions for which the two posteriors of
E are common knowledge, and hence, by Aumann’s disagreement theorem, they coin-
cide. Obviously, at this stage there is no trade, namely, one of the parties refuses to bet
(Sebenius and Geanakoplos 1983).
Thus, the dynamics that leads to no trade ends with an agreement to agree on the
posterior of E. The result of this paper shows that the limit partitions of this process are
not arbitrary, and provides the precise relationship between the limit partitions and the
event E.
1.7 Agreement theorems
The literature abounds with generalizations of Aumann’s agreement theorem. In this
theorem the disagreement concerns the posterior of an event. Milgrom and Stokey
(1982), Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983), and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990)s t u d y
agreement theorems where the disagreement concerns the value or expected value of
random variables.
Aumann’s theorem provides a necessary condition for the existence of a common
prior. Feinberg (1995), Morris (1994), Bonanno and Nehring (1966), and Samet (1998)
showthatwhendisagreementsareextendedtorandomvariables, thentheimpossibility
of agreeing to disagree is a necessary condition for the existence of a common prior.
McKelvey and Page (1986)a n dNielsen et al. (1990) show that when the agents have
different posteriors, then not only can these posteriors not be common knowledge, but
also certain aggregates of the posteriors cannot be common knowledge.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983), Parikh
and Krasucki (1990), and Heifetz (1996) study the dynamics of information exchange
that leads from disagreement to agreement.
In Bacharach (1985)a n dSamet (1990), Aumann’s theorem is generalized to a non-
partition information structure. In Monderer and Samet (1989), common p-belief,274 Lehrer and Samet Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
rather than common knowledge, is shown to imply a bound on the probabilistic
disagreement.
All the above-mentioned agreement theorems study the impossibility of commonly
sharing probabilistic disagreements. This paper, in contrast, studies the impossibility
of common knowledge of probabilistic agreements. As it turns out, the impossibility
of having common knowledge of agents’ posterior for an event may be the result not
of the probabilistic disagreement, but rather the structure of the event and the parti-
tions. While the starting point of the literature on agreement theorems is the probabilis-
tic structure juxtaposed with the knowledge structure, here it is the knowledge struc-
ture alone. We look for conditions that characterize the events for which there exists a
probabilisticstructurethatmakesitpossibletohavecommonknowledgeofagreements
regarding the posterior of these events.
1.8 Outline
In the next section, we introduce the basics of the model of knowledge and belief. The
main elements of our agreeing theorems, ignorance and the possibility of agreeing to
agree are deﬁned in Section 3, and the main results are stated. A counterexample for
uncountable information structures is presented in Section 4. Two open problems are
discussed in Section 5 and the proofs are given in the last section.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Information structures
We ﬁx a state space (  B),w i t has e to fstates   anda σ-ﬁeldofevents B.A ninformation
structureonthestatespace,foragents1and2,isapair( 1  2)ofcountablemeasurable
partitions of  . For every state ω, we denote by  i(ω) the element in  i that contains ω.
For an event F and agent i, we denote by  F
i the partition  i ∨{ F ¬F},w h i c hi st h e
join of the partitions  i and {F ¬F}.1 It describes the information of the agent when, in
addition to the information given by  i, she is also informed whether F occurred.
2.2 Knowledge and common knowledge
We say that agent i knows event E at ω when  i(ω) ⊆ E. Thus, the event that i knows E
is Ki(E) ={ ω |  i(ω) ⊆ E}. The event that both agents know E is K(E)= K1(E)∩K2(E).
The event that E is common knowledge is K∞(E) =
∞
n=1Kn(E). It is the union of all
the elements of the join  1 ∨  2 contained in E. For further discussion of knowledge
andcommonknowledge,seeAumann (1976),MondererandSamet(1989),Geanakoplos
(1994), Fagin et al. (1995), and Aumann (1999).
Note that the epistemic operators Ki, K,a n dK∞ are deﬁned with respect to the
information structure ( 1  2). Inthesequelweconsideralsotheinformation structure
( F
1   F
2 )onthesamestatespace. Wemakeitclearwhenweusetheepistemicoperators
with respect to this latter information structure.
1The join of two partitions is their ﬁnest common coarsening.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Agreeing to agree 275
The event F belongs to the join  F
1 ∨  F
2 . Thus, in the information structure
( F
1   F
2 ), F = K∞(F) and ¬F = K∞(¬F). Indeed, this information structure can be
deﬁned as the one obtained from making F and ¬F common knowledge.
2.3 Posteriors and priors
A posterior of agent i, for the information structure ( 1  2), is a family of probability
measures {μω
i } on (  B) for i = 1 2 and each ω,s u c ht h a tμω
i ( i(ω)) = 1 and for each
ω  ∈  i(ω), μω 
i = μω
i .Acommon prior for the posteriors of the agents is a probability
measure μ on (  B) such that μω
i (·) = μ(·| i(ω)) whenever μ( i(ω)) > 0.
3. Agreeing to agree:D efinitions and main results
3.1 Agreements
An agreement is an event that the posteriors of the agents coincide at some given prob-
ability. The formal deﬁnition follows.
Definition 1. Let E be an event in the state space (  B) with information structure
( 1  2) and posteriors {μω
i }.A nagreement on E is an event
A ={ ω | μω
1 (E) = μω
2 (E) = p} (1)
for some 0 <p<1.
Note thatthis deﬁnition requiresthatthe agreedupon posteriors bestrictly between
0a n d1 .
Next we formally deﬁne the possibility that there is common knowledge of an
agreement.
Definition 2. Let E be an event in the state space (  B) with information structure
( 1  2). Agreeing to agree is possible for E if there are posteriors with a common prior μ
and an agreement A on E for these posteriors such that μ(K∞(A)) > 0.
Definition 3. The event that agent i is ignorant of E is
Ii(E) =¬ Ki(E)∩¬Ki(¬E) 
The event that both agents are ignorant of E is I(E)= I1(E)∩I2(E).
Thus, I(E)is the event that none of the agents can tell whether E i st h ec a s eo r¬E
is the case.2
2Thenegationoftheoperator Ii istheknowingwhether operator, Ji(E) = Ki(E)∪Ki(¬E), theproperties
of which were studied in Hart et al. (1996).276 Lehrer and Samet Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
3.2 The main results
Ourﬁrsttheoremstatesthatagreeingtoagreeispossiblefor E ifandonlyifthereexistsa
nonemptyﬁniteeventF,atwhichitiscommonknowledgethatbothagentsareignorant
of E. Moreover, this holds true also after F becomes common knowledge. Formally and
succinctly, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem1. AgreeingtoagreeispossibleforeventE ifandonlyifthereexistsanonempty
ﬁnite event F such that
F ⊆ K∞(I(E)) (2)
with respect to both ( 1  2) and ( F
1   F
2 ).
T h ef a c tt h a ta tF it is common knowledge that both agents are also ignorant of E is
expressed by F ⊆ K∞(I(E)),w i t hr e s p e c tt o( 1  2). The fact that it remains common
knowledge that both agents are also ignorant of E after F becomes common knowledge
isconveyedbyF ⊆ K∞(I(E)),withr espectto( F
1   F
2 ). Whentheinformationstructure
is ﬁnite, the condition for agreeing to agree becomes simpler.
Corollary. If the information structure is ﬁnite, then agreeing to agree is possible for E,
if and only if
K∞(I(E))  = ∅  (3)
To see this, note ﬁrst that since F  = ∅,( 2)i m p l i e sK∞(I(E))  = ∅.C o n v e r s e l y , i f
(3) holds, deﬁne F = K∞(I(E)),w h e r eF is obviously nonempty and ﬁnite. Moreover,
since F is an element of the join partition,  1 ∨  2, it follows that  F
i =  i for i = 1 2.
Therefore, (2) holds with respect to both ( 1  2) and ( F
1   F
2 ).
Notice that the condition for agreeing to agree in Theorem 1 is formulated solely in
terms of the information structure. The next theorem provides a condition in proba-
bilistic terms.
Theorem 2. Agreeing to agree is possible for E if and only if it is possible with a common
prior that has a ﬁnite support.
3.3 Positive priors
A common prior determines the posteriors only on elements of the partition to which
it assigns positive probability; on elements of probability zero, the posteriors can be
deﬁned arbitrarily. Of special interest are common priors that determine uniquely the
posteriors, that is, common priors that assign a positive probability to all the elements
in both partitions. We next characterize events for which agreeing to agree is possible
with such a common prior. This characterization is done in terms of events called loops,
which play a central role also in the proof of Theorem 1.
Definition 4. A loop on E is an event L that consists of 2n distinct points ω1 ω 
1     
ωn ω 
n for some integer n ≥ 1,s u c ht h a tTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Agreeing to agree 277
Figure 1. A loop on E with 6 points. The dot shaped states, ω1, ω2, ω3,a r ei nE, and the dia-
mond shaped states, ω 
1, ω 
2, ω 
3,a r ei n¬E.
(i) ωk ∈ E and ω 
k ∈¬ E for any k = 1     n,a n d
(ii) ω 
k ∈  1(ωk) and ωk ∈  2(ω 
k−1) for any k = 1     n,w h e r eω 
0 = ω 
n.
Figure 1 illustrates a loop. The following two propositions relate loops to events F
that satisfy (2).
Proposition 1. If F is a nonempty ﬁnite event such that F ⊆ K∞(I(E)) with respect to
( F
1   F
2 ),t h e nF contains a loop on E.
Proposition 2. If L is a loop on E,t h e nL ⊆ K∞(I(E)) with respect to ( L
1   L
2 ).
In the next theorem, we state formally that agreeing to agree is possible for E with a
common prior that assigns positive probability to each element of each partition, if and
only if it is common knowledge at some state that neither of the players excludes the
possibility of loops.
Theorem 3. Agreeing to agree is possible for E with a common prior that assigns a posi-
tive probability to each element of  1 or  2 if and only if K∞(¬K1(¬ ˆ L)∩¬K2(¬ ˆ L))  = ∅,
where ˆ L is the union of all loops on E.
4. Uncountable information structures
Sofarwehaveassumedthatthepartitionsarecountable. Tostudythequestionofagree-
ing to agree in models with uncountable partitions, we need ﬁrst to deﬁne in such mod-
els posteriors and common priors.
4.1 Posteriors and common prior for the uncountable case
Posteriors {μω
i } are deﬁned as in the countable case with an additional measurability
requirement: μω
i (E) is measurable as a function of ω for any ﬁxed event E and i = 1 2.
Equivalently, for i = 1 2, any ﬁxed event E,a n dp, {ω | μω
i (E) ≥ p} is a measurable set.278 Lehrer and Samet Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)





i (E)dμ(ω)  (4)





i (E)dμ(ω) = μ
ω0
i (E)μ( i(ω0)) 
This implies that if μ( i(ω0)) > 0,t h e nμω
i (E) = μ(E |  i(ω)), which shows that (4) in-
deed generalizes the deﬁnition of a common prior in the countable partitions case.3
4.2 Theorem 1 and the uncountable case
The proof that the condition in Theorem 1 is sufﬁcient does not make use of the count-
ability of the information structure and, therefore, it holds also for uncountable infor-
mation structures. The proof that the condition is necessary relies on the countability
assumption. As shown by the following example, depicted in Figure 2, the assumption
is essential: the condition is not necessary in the uncountable case.
Example 5. Consider a state space   that consists of the union of the following
four disjoint sets Ai, i = 1     4,i nR2: A1 ={ (x x + 1) |− 1 <x<0}, A2 ={ (x x) |
Figure 2. Theorem 1 fails in the uncountable case. The state space consists of the three di-
agonals A1, A2,a n dA3,a n do fA4. The latter is obtained by a rightward shift of the top-right
diagonal by an irrational number c. Agent 1 is informed of the ﬁrst coordinate of the state and
agent 2 is informed of the second. The event E is the union of A1 and A3. There are no loops
on E; nevertheless, agreeing to agree is possible with the common prior that is uniform on the
sets Ai.
3See Samet (1999, 2000) for studies of belief systems with uncountable information structures.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Agreeing to agree 279
−1 <x<0}, A3 ={ (x x − 1) | 0 <x<1},a n dA4 ={ (x ϕ(x)) | 0 <x<1},w h e r eϕ(x) =
x−c(mod1) for a ﬁxed irrational c in (0 1).T h eσ-ﬁeld on   is the Borel σ-ﬁeld on the
sets Ai.
Agent 1 is informed of the ﬁrst coordinate of the state and agent 2 is informed of the
second. Thus, each element of  1 contains the two points on the vertical line that con-
tains the state. Similarly,  2 contains the two points on the horizontal line that includes
the state.
The posterior μω
i for each of the two points in  i(ω) is 1
2. To see that the measura-
bility condition is satisﬁed, consider P :  → R, the projection of the state space on the
ﬁrst coordinate. Note that both P and P−1 map measurable sets to measurable sets.
Now, if p ∈ (1
2 1] and E is a measurable set, then {ω | μω
1 (E) ≥ p}=P−1(P(E ∩ A1) ∩
P(E∩A2))∪P−1(P(E∩A3)∩P(E∩A4)),whichismeasurable. Alternatively,ifp ∈ (0  1
2],
then{ω | μω
1 (E) ≥ p}=P−1(P(E∩A1)∪P(E∩A2))∪P−1(P(E∩A3)∪P(E∩A4)),which
is also measurable. A similar argument shows that the measurability condition holds for
the second agent’s posterior as well.
Let μ betheprobabilitymeasure 1
4
4
i=1μi,w h e r eμi istheLebesguemeasureon Ai.
It is easy to see that μ is a common prior for {μω
i }. Denote E = A1 ∪ A3.F o ri = 1 2 and
every ω, μω
i (E) = 1
2. Thus agreeing to agree is possible for E. We show that there is no
loop for E and, therefore, by Proposition 1, Theorem 1 does not hold in this case.
Suppose that ω1 = (a − 1 a)∈ A1 ⊆ E is the ﬁrst point in a loop. Then ω 
1 is nec-
essarily (a − 1 a− 1) ∈ A2 ⊆¬ E. The next two points must be ω2 = (a a − 1) ∈ A3
and ω 
2 = (a ϕ(a)) ∈ A4.T h u sω3 = (ϕ(a) − 1 ϕ(a)) ∈ A1. Continuing this way, we ob-
tain that the second coordinates of the points {ω2k+1}k≥0 are {ϕ)k(a)}k≥0. Since c is
irrational, all the numbers in the latter sequence are distinct and, therefore, so are all




are disjoint as they belong to different sets Ai. Thus, the sequence starting with ω1 ∈ A1
is inﬁnite. This also shows that any sequence starting with ω1 ∈ A3 is also inﬁnite and,
therefore, there cannot be a loop L on E. ♦
4.3 The pathology in this example
Each element of the join  1 ∨ 2 can be written as a doubly inﬁnite countable sequence
    ω−k ω 
−k     ω1 ω 
1     ωk ω 
k     
such that ({ωk ω 
k})∞
k=−∞ ⊆  1 and ({ω 
k ωk+1})∞
k=−∞ ⊆  2. This sequence is con-
structed in both directions in the same way as the sequence above. If such a sequence is
considered a subspace, there is no common prior on this subspace. Indeed, a common
prior ν should satisfy, for each k, ν(ωk) = ν(ω 
k) and also ν(ω 
k) = ν(ωk+1). Thus, all the
states must have the same probability, which is impossible.
The pathology in this example concerns the question of the existence of a common
prior for given posteriors. On one hand, there exists a common prior since the mea-
sure μ satisﬁes (4). On the other hand, for any element of the join  1 ∨  2,t h e r ei s
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the event of the join containing this state. This is the smallest event that is commonly
known by the agents at this state. In our space, at any state there is no common prior on
the relevant subspace containing it.
Thisexampleraisesconceptualdifﬁcultiesconcerningthenotionofacommonprior
in the case of uncountable information structures. The problem was ﬁrst observed (in a
different state space) and discussed in Simon (1998).
5. Open problems
5.1 Uncountable information structures
The necessity of the condition in Theorem 1 is proved by negation. We show that if
agreeing to agree holds for E and the condition fails, then the prior probability of each
element of  1 is zero. This constitutes a contradiction because the partition is count-
able. Here we use the countability of only one of the partitions, but as we explain next,
the proof requires that both be countable.
Propositions 3 and 4 are the two main parts of the proof that the condition in The-
orem 1 is necessary. In the proof of the ﬁrst one, we deﬁne a binary relationship on  1.
Using this relation, we coarsen both partitions by grouping together the elements of the
partitions. The second proposition uses this grouping to show that elements of  1 that
do not intersect a loop must be assigned zero probability by the common prior.
The grouping of the elements of the partitions in the proof of Proposition 3 does not
requirecountablepartitions. However,thecountabilityofthepartitionsisusedtoestab-
lish that the grouped elements are measurable sets. Although the statement of Proposi-
tion 4 refers solely to elements in  1, the proof makes use also of the measurability of
eventsresultingfromthegroupingprocedureover  2. Theseeventsaremeasurabledue
to countability. Therefore, our proofs hinge on the countability of both partitions.
The countability assumption in Theorem 1 is essential, because, as has been shown
intheprevioussection,theconditioninthetheoremisnotnecessaryintheuncountable
case. It has been noted, though, that the common prior, which enables the agreeing to
agree in the previous section, is pathological in the sense that it fails to induce common
priors on the elements of the join of the partitions. This suggests the following problem.
Open Problem 1. Consider a state space with an uncountable information structure.
Assume that there is a common prior that induces a common prior on each nonnull ele-
ment of the join of the partitions.4 Does this imply that agreeing to disagree is possible if
and only if the condition in Theorem 1 is satisﬁed?
5.2 More than two agents
Allourresultswereformulated and proved formodelswith two agents. Generalizing the
notion of a loop to many agents may enable a generalization of the sufﬁciency part of
Theorem 1 to more than two agents. However, the proof of the necessity part strongly
depends on having two agents.
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The binary relationship employed in the proof of Proposition 3,a sw e l la st h eg r o u p -
ing of the elements of the partitions, is deﬁned only for two agents. We know of no way
to generalize it to more than two agents.
OpenProblem2. Findanecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionintermsoftheinformation
structure for the possibility of agreeing to agree in models with more than two agents.
6. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.L e tF be a nonempty event that satisﬁes (2)w i t hr e s p e c t
to the information structure ( F
1   F
2 ).F o r e a c h ω ∈ F and i = 1 2,w eh a v e F
i (ω) ⊆
F ⊆ K∞(I(E)) ⊆ I(E) (where K∞ and I are considered as operators with respect to
( F
1   F
2 )). Hence,  F
i (ω) ∩ E  = ∅ and  F
i (ω) ∩¬ E  = ∅, i = 1 2. Therefore, there is
a sequence5 ω1 ω 
1     ωk ω 
k    in F such that ωk ∈ E, ω 
k ∈¬ E, ω 
k ∈  F
1 (ωk),a n d
ωk+1 ∈  F
2 (ω 
k), for every k ≥ 1. Since for each ω ∈ F and i = 1 2,  F
i (ω) =  i(ω) ∩ F,i t
follows that ω 
k ∈  1(ωk) and ωk+1 ∈  2(ω 
k) for every k ≥ 1.
Note thatsince ωk ∈ E and ω 
k ∈¬ E,t h e nωk  = ω 
k.T h u s ,a sF is ﬁnite, thesequence
must contain a subsequence ωk+1 ω 
k+1     ωk+n ω 
k+n of 2n distinct points, for n ≥ 1
such that ωk+n+1 = ωk+1. This sequence is a loop on E.  
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a loop on E,
L ={ ω1 ω 
1     ωn ω 
n} 
By the ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 4, L ⊆ I(E). By the second condition, some coarsen-
ing of {{ω1 ω 
1}     {ωn ω 
n}} is included in  F
1 and some coarsening of {{ω 
1 ω2}     
{ω 
n ω1}} is included in  F
2 . Therefore, L ⊆  1 ∨ 2.T h u s ,L ⊆ K∞(I(E)) with respect to
( F
1   F
2 ).  
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. Let P0 ∈  1. Suppose that for every loop L on E, L∩P0 = ∅. Then there
is a coarsening of  1, {PE P¬E P0},a n dac o a r s e n i n go f 2, {QE Q¬E},s u c ht h a t 6
(PE ∪P0)∩QE ⊆ E (5)
and
(P¬E ∪P0)∩Q¬E ⊆¬ E  (6)
Proof. In this proof, P and Q denote generic elements of  1 and  2, respectively. We
deﬁne a binary relation ρ on  1: PρP  if for some Q, P ∩Q∩E  = ∅ and P  ∩Q∩¬E  = ∅.
We denote by   the transitive closure7 of ρ.
5The sequence may be constructed inductively.
6We allow each of the sets PE, P¬E, QE, and Q¬E to be empty.
7That is, P   P  if there are P1     Pn in  1,w i t hn ≥ 2,s u c ht h a tP1 = P, Pn = P , and, for j = 1     n−1,
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Figure 3. An illustration for Proposition 3. The elements of  1 are horizontal; those of  2 are
vertical.
Obviously,   is transitive. We show that P0    P0. Suppose to the contrary that
P0   P0. Then there is a sequence P0     Pn,s u c ht h a t
P0 = Pn ρ···ρP 1 ρP 0  (7)
Moreover,bytakingtheshortestsequenceofthiskind,wecanassumethatP1     Pn are
distinct. By (7), there are Q0     Qn−1 in  2 such that for k = 1     n, Pk ∩Qk−1 ∩E  = ∅
and Pk−1 ∩Qk−1 ∩¬E  = ∅.
For each k = 1     n choose ωk ∈ Pk ∩ Qk−1 ∩ E and ω 
k ∈ Qk ∩ Pk ∩¬ E,w h e r e
Qn = Q0.A l l 2n points are distinct. Indeed, ωk  = ω 
k because ωk ∈ E and ω 
k ∈¬ E.
Moreover, since {ωk ω 
k}⊆Pk and P1     Pn are all distinct, each pair {ωk ω 
k} belongs
to a different element of  1. Thus, the points ω1 ω 
1     ωn ω 
n form a loop on E that
intersects P0 at ωn. This contradicts the assumption and we conclude that P0    P0.
Deﬁne PE to be the union of all elements P that satisfy P   P0. Since P0    P0,i t
follows that P0 ∩PE = ∅.T h es e tP¬E is the complementary set of PE ∪P0.A ne l e m e n tQ
is a subset of Q¬E if and only if there exists P,s u c ht h a tP ⊆ PE ∪P0 and P ∩Q∩¬E  = ∅.
The set QE is the complement of Q¬E.
By the deﬁnition of QE,f o re a c hQ ⊆ QE and P ⊆ PE ∪ P0, P ∩ Q ∩¬ E = ∅,w h i c h
proves(5). Toprove(6),supposetothecontrarythatforsomeP ⊆ P¬E∪P0 andQ ⊆ Q¬E,
P ∩Q∩E  = ∅. By the deﬁnition of Q¬E,t h e r ei sP  ⊆ PE ∪P0 such that P  ∩Q∩¬E  = ∅.
Thus, P   P .( S e eFigure 3.)
Now, if P  = P0,t h e nP   P0.E l s eP  ⊆ PE, in which case P   P    P0.T h u s ,i n e i -
ther case P   P0, which implies that P ⊆ PE. This contradicts the assumption that P ⊆
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Proposition 4. Let E be an event, let {μω
i } be posteriors with a common prior μ,a n dl e t
A be the agreement {ω | μω
1 (E) = μω
2 (E) = p} for some 0 <p<1.I fP0 ∈  1, P0 ⊆ K∞(A),
and P0 ∩L = ∅ for all loops L on E,t h e nμ(P0) = 0.
Proof.I nc a s eμ(K∞(A)) = 0, the proof is complete since P0 ⊆ K∞(A).O t h e r w i s e ,
deﬁne ν(·) = μ(·|K∞(A)). Note that ν is also a common prior for the posteriors8 {μω
i }.
Moreover, if ν( i(ω)) > 0,t h e nμω
i (E) = p.
By Proposition3, therearepartitions {PE P¬E P0} and {QE Q¬E} thatsatisfy(5)and
(6). The events PE and Q¬E are unions of elements of  1 and  2, respectively, and since
the partitions are countable, these events are measurable. From the deﬁnitions of A
and ν, it follows that ν(E ∩ PE) = pν(PE) and ν(¬E ∩ PE) = (1 − p)ν(PE). Thus (recall,
1−p>0),
ν(E ∩PE) = (p/(1−p))ν(¬E ∩PE)  (8)
By a similar argument,
ν(E ∩Q¬E) = (p/(1−p))ν(¬E ∩Q¬E)  (9)
By (6), the relation between the events on the left sides of (8)a n d( 9)i sE ∩ Q¬E ⊆
E ∩ PE. Hence, by comparing the right sides of (8)a n d( 9), we obtain (after dividing
by p/(1−p)  = 0)
ν(¬E ∩PE) ≥ ν(¬E ∩Q¬E) 
By (5), the event on the left side is a subset of the event on the right side. Thus their
difference must have probability 0. This difference is
(¬E ∩Q¬E)\(¬E ∩PE) =¬ E ∩(Q¬E \PE)
=¬ E ∩(Q¬E ∩(P¬E ∪P0))
= Q¬E ∩(P¬E ∪P0) 
where the last equality holds by (6).
We conclude that ν(Q¬E ∩ (P¬E ∪ P0)) = 0 and, in particular, ν(Q¬E ∩ P0) = 0.B y
(5), Q¬E ∩ P0 ⊆¬ E.H e n c e ,Q¬E ∩ P0 =¬ E ∩ P0.T h u s ,ν(¬E ∩ P0) = 0 and, therefore,
μ(¬E ∩ P0) = 0. However, by assumption, P0 ⊆ K∞(A) and, therefore, for every ω ∈ P0,
μω
1 (¬E)= 1−p>0. This is possible only when μ(P0) = 0.  
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that a nonempty ﬁnite F is a subset of K∞(I(E)) with
respect to both ( 1  2) and ( F
1   F
2 ).T h u s , K∞(I(E)) with respect to ( 1  2) is
nonempty.
From now on (in this proof), the operators K∞ and I are used with respect to
( 1  2). Weconstructposteriors{μω
i }withacommonpriorμsuchthatμ(K∞(I(E))) >
8This is so since K∞(A) is in the join of the partitions. Therefore, ν(·) induces over K∞(A) the same
posteriors as μ, while on the complement of K∞(A), the posteriors can be deﬁned so as to coincide with
{μω
i }.284 Lehrer and Samet Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
0 and K∞(I(E)) ⊆ A,w h e r eA ={ ω | μω
1 (E) = μω
2 (E) = 1
2}. This inclusion implies
K∞(I(E)) ⊆ K∞(A), which shows that μ(K∞(A)) > 0 and thereby establishes the fact
that agreeing to agree is possible for E.
By Propositions 1 and 2, there exists a loop L ={ ω1 ω 
1     ωn ω 
n} on E such
that L ⊆ K∞(I(E)). D e ﬁ n eac o m m o np r i o rμ such that μ(ωk) = μ(ω 
k) = 1/(2n) for
k = 1     n.C o n s i d e rP ∈  1 such that P ⊆ K∞(I(E)).
Suppose that P ∩L  = ∅.T h e nωk ∈ P if ω 
k ∈ P. Since all the points in L are distinct,
it follows that P contains the same number of points in E ∩ F and in ¬E ∩ F.T h u sf o r
ω ∈ P, μω
1 (E) = 1
2.
If P ∩ L = ∅,t h e nμ(P) = 0 and, therefore, the posteriors on P can be deﬁned ar-
bitrarily. Since P ⊆ K∞(I(E)), it follows that P ⊆ I(E) and, therefore, P ∩ E  = ∅ and
P ∩¬E  = ∅. We deﬁne the posterior μω
1 for ω ∈ P such that μω
1 (E) = μω
1 (E) = 1
2.
A similar argument holds for elements Q ∈  2. This shows that K∞(I(E)) ⊆ A,a s
required.
The proof of the converse direction makes use of Propositions 3 and 4. Suppose
that agreeing to agree is possible for E for posteriors with a common prior μ and the
agreement A (recall (1)). This means that
μ(K∞(A)) > 0  (10)
Obviously, A ⊆ I(E)and, therefore,
K∞(A) ⊆ K∞(I(E))  (11)
By (10)a n d( 11), K∞(I(E)) is not empty.
Since K∞(I(E)) isaunionofelementsofthejoin  1∨ 2,itfollowsthatforaloop L,
if L∩K∞(I(E))  = ∅ then L ⊆ K∞(I(E))  (12)
Assume that there exists a loop L on E such that L ⊆ K∞(I(E)).B yProposition 2,
F = L is a nonempty ﬁnite set that satisﬁes (2) and the proof is complete. Otherwise,
for every loop L on E, L   K∞(I(E)), which implies by (12)t h a tL ∩ K∞(I(E)) = ∅.
Thus, by (11), L ∩ K∞(A) = ∅. Therefore, by Proposition 4,f o re a c hP0 ∈  1 such
that P0 ⊆ K∞(A), μ(P0) = 0. Since the partitions are countable, this implies that
μ(K∞(A)) = 0, which contradicts (10).  
Proof of Theorem 2. If agreeing to agree is possible for E, then the condition of The-
orem 1 holds. As was shown in the ﬁrst part of its proof, this condition implies that
agreeing to agree is made possible by a common prior supported on a loop, which is a
ﬁnite event.  
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume ﬁrst that the event
ˆ   = K∞(¬K1(¬ ˆ L)∩¬K2(¬ ˆ L))
is not empty. Then, for each P ∈  i, i = 1 2,i fP ⊆ ˆ  ,t h e nP ⊆¬ K1(¬ ˆ L)∩¬K2(¬ ˆ L) and
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Since ˆ   is a union of elements of the join of  1 ∨  2, it follows that for a loop L,i f
L ∩ ˆ    = ∅,t h e nL ⊆ ˆ  .L e t{L1 L2    } be the set of all the loops contained in ˆ  .F o r
each n,l e tμn be a probability distribution on Ln such that for each ω ∈ Ln, μn(ω) =
1/(2|Ln|).9 Let μ =

2−nμn. Then, for P ∈  i, i = 1 2, μ(P ∩ E) =

2−nμn(P ∩ E) =

2−n(1/2)μn(P) = (1/2)μ(P).
Since for each P ∈  i that is a subset of ˆ  , P ∩ ˆ L  = ∅, it follows that μ(P) > 0.I n
addition, μ vanishes on the complement of ˆ  .L e tμ  be any measure on   that vanishes
on ˆ   and is positive on the elements of  1 and  2 that are not subsets of ˆ  .D e ﬁ n e
ν = μ/2 +μ /2.T h e nν is positive on  1 and  2.L e t{νω
i } be the posteriors deﬁned by ν.
Then ˆ   ⊆ K∞(A) for A ={ ω | νω
1 (E) = νω
1 (E) = 1/2} and ν(ˆ  ) > 0, which shows that
agreeing to agree is possible for E with the prior ν that assigns a positive probability to
every element of either partition.
As for the converse direction, assume that there are posteriors {μω
i } with a com-
mon prior μ that is positive on every element of  1 or  2. Furthermore, assume that
A is an event of the sort {ω | μω
1 (E) = μω
2 (E) = p} for some 0 <p<1 that satisﬁes
μ(K∞(A)) > 0. It is sufﬁcient to show that K∞(A) ⊆ K∞(¬K1(¬ ˆ L) ∩¬ K2(¬ ˆ L)).F o r
this it sufﬁces to show that for i = 1 2 and any P ∈  i such that P ⊆ K∞(A), P ∩ ˆ L  = ∅.
Indeed, if to the contrary, P ∩ ˆ L = ∅ for such P,t h e nb yProposition 4, μ(P) = 0.T h i s
contradicts the positivity of μ on every element of either partition.  
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